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Introduction1
Perpetual conflict in South Asia continues to worry citizens and scholars alike. India and
Pakistan find themselves locked in a historical clash which offers no foreseeable conclusion.
Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Jinnah, respective first leaders of the post-partition nation
states, failed in their predictions that a separation of the subcontinent would ease the tensions of
their fellow countrymen. Nuclearization of both states in the late 1990’s gifted horror to
international observers, clinging to a sense of deterrence found in the US-USSR conflict in the
Cold War. Conflict resolution between India and Pakistan began with an official United Nations
mission soon after partition, but no fruitful peace has surfaced to date. Is a lasting resolution
between India and Pakistan of Kashmir possible? Scholars of international relations focus on
general realist concepts to explain the conflict dynamic, pointing to mutually assured destruction
post-nuclear armament as a deterrent to escalated motivations of war. This theory fails to
represent the internal mechanisms of each nation state, focusing heavily on the notion of rational
yet turbulent actors in the region. This research attempts to take one case study, India, and
dissect its internal structures that promote ongoing conflict. Constructivist theory will be applied
for analysis of Indian propensity to continue conflict with Pakistan at social and political levels.
The timeframe of observation will begin following the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008
to the current Narendra Modi BJP regime in 2018. Qualitative methods like archival research
will be utilized with observations on Hindu ideology and Indian policy towards Kashmir.
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Literature Review
I. International Relations Theories
Academic research on the subject of Kashmir generally pertains to the ongoing relations
between India and Pakistan. Within international relations, sub-theories like neorealism and
neoliberalism are used in the subcontinental context. Constructivism in international relations
theory is an underutilized tool in scholarly analysis, pointed out by Sridharan (2005, 109) in the
context of dominant dueling sub-theories with less significant work completed under the
constructivist theoretical framework. Neorealism in South Asia pertains to a desire to balance
each other’s power through security measures and achieve relative gains in the region.
Neoliberalism focuses more on the perceptions of the other state and one’s strategic setting in the
world order, such as their place in the United Nations or regional organizations (Sridharan, 2005,
109). Looking past these external-observatory frameworks and diving into the psychological
underpinnings of a specific nation state that create said state’s norms can build a better
understanding of India’s role.
Constructivism is the sub-theory utilized in the analysis of national institutions and their
decision-making process (Hopf, 1998; Adler, 2002). The framework helps scholars to present the
inner-workings of a particular country, with focus on the historical norms and underlying
psychology of the people and their representatives. Under the umbrella of international relations,
it does not rely on a bilateral dynamic to explain foreign policy, but explains how one state
relates to the majority of their allies and opponents. The pivotal work of Wendt (1995) in
theorizing constructivism allows research to focus on the inner-workings of a singular nation
state rather than external national and institutional influences. He seeks to unearth the anarchical
tendencies of domestic actions from realism to explain the abstract consequences of
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postmodernism and critical theory. To fully comprehend the pressing issues of Kashmir through
a constructivist lens, one must also consider psychological factors.
II. Psychology Theories
Moghaddam (2018) contributes to the psychological understanding of the Indian relations
toolkit with mutual radicalization theory. It can be defined as the effect of state relations as a
catalyst for public formations of radical ideology towards another state. In this case, Indian
policy becomes reactionary and aggressive due to Pakistani policy towards Kashmir, and vice
versa. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is a “prize” for India, losing which would result in
“national defeat and humiliation” (Moghaddam, 2018, p. 137). Pakistan’s support of non-state
actors in the region increases Indian radicalization in the public mindset and legislative policy.
One major example lies in the Maharashtra city of Mumbai in 2008. The events of 26/11, terror
attacks on Mumbai targets orchestrated by Pakistani assailants, pushed to radicalize an already
tense Indian population, as well as forming a victim identity of the state for the Indian public
(Moghaddam, 2018, p. 146). Much like their American counterparts in 2001, Indians felt
victimized and ready to retaliate against their Northwestern neighbor.
Another important theory to understand the Indian dynamic is Communal Polarization. A
variation on the widely-used term political polarization, the communal version emphasizes the
stark divide of groups based on identity, along with an assumption of violence. Many scholars
use the term in their psychological understandings of India (Bhagat, 2012; Pardeshi 2018).
Communal polarization is relatively tied to the Indian case study, given its diversity and history
of violence along religious lines. Sheth (2002) accounts the Gujarat state’s dive into communal
riots and ethno-religious conflict after partition of India. Local politicians incurred such tension
in the population of the North Indian state for short-term political gain. The violence goes against
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the perspectives of Gandhi and Jinnah just a generation prior, but garners more legitimacy with
the known leadership of Narendra Modi as Chief Minister of Gujarat before his tenure at the
national level. In international terms, as tensions rise between two nations through resentment
and misunderstood action, consequential action is taken by a state actor in official retaliation.
This theory differs from mutual radicalization in the implementation of negative policies and
military force rather than mere heightened tensions.
Putting radicalization and communal polarization to a face, the Rashtriya Swayamsewak
Sangh, translated as the National Volunteer Organization, stands as the most prominent Hindu
nationalist group in India. Chronicled by Bala (2017), the RSS began as an answer to HinduMuslim riots in the 1920s, leading concerned Hindus, such as Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar and
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar to begin a campaign to unite Hindus towards independence. The
RSS officially launched in 1925 with one locality where they had their work. The organization
was banned four times, once by the British Raj and thrice by the Republic of India. As of 2016,
the RSS holds over 56,000 local branches all across India. Their mission is to bolster the Hindu
identity and protect Hindus from “Muslim annihilation” (Bala, 914). Political ambitions begin in
the 1980s with the current national government party head.
A thorough theory in psychology to illustrate India’s policy towards Kashmir is In-Group
Favoritism, defined as a preference toward one’s particular group to another (Everett, Faber, and
Crockett, 2015). The psychological phenomenon is chosen due to the study focusing primarily
upon elite government action, not the Indian citizen (radicalization) or a identity group
(communal polarization). In-group favoritism benefits from its lack of connection to previous
literature involving local Indian violence, allowing for an objective lens into the ruling party’s
decision-making. Taking directly from the BJP’s Hindu Nationalist ideology, actions taken by
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the government against Pakistan serve as betterment and self-defense of the former state. India
gave Pakistan time following 26/11 to follow through and investigate the perpetrators
thoroughly, but after years of no significant progress India began viewing Pakistan as a state
sponsor of terror in groups like Al Qaeda and more recently, Jaish e Mohammed. Such
connections force liberal democratic countries to engage states with caution and possible force
for their own safety. The tensions prevent Indian government officials, even through diplomatic
channels, from having a frank conversation on the future of Kashmir.
III. Interdisciplinary Theory and Implementation
As for norms analysis in constructivist theory, Ogden (2010) observes Indian foreign
policy from 1998 to 2004, the first national government led by the BJP through the National
Democratic Alliance coalition, and compares their legislative action to historical precedent. He
found that the BJP was constrained by Indian norms by negotiating with Pakistan after
“rhetorical confrontation”, but transformed relations through the assimilation of nationalist
Hindutva ideology into foreign policy (Ogden, 2010, 308). The latter can be seen in the
preservation and growth of the Indian identity and desire to maintain a South Asian hegemony
over Pakistan and other neighbors.
The following study will take from both International Relations and Psychology to
produce a theoretical basis for the implementation of In-Group Favoritism in Constructivist
theory. The combination provides the blueprint for future norms analysis of a given nation-state,
supplementing the psychological theory of best fit for the circumstances in a country’s foreign
policy. For use in studying elite governmental decision-making, the author finds In-Group
Favoritism to be the theory of best fit, while communal polarization is necessary for religious
groups or other non-state actors, and radicalization is best for the individual.
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Applying the norms analysis to the case of India, the government relies on three major
factors in relations with their nation-state neighbors: mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and
non-interference (Ogden, 2010). Dependent upon the administration, their relations with Pakistan
garnered respect, relative peaceful coexistence, and non-interference. This research dives into the
timeline of the 26/11 attacks, recording changes in diplomatic attitudes towards Pakistan. The
latter half of the analysis reviews the diplomatic efforts of the Modi Administration.
Constructivism also pulls from the psychological lexicon, providing deeper context into the BJP
and their intentions.
Methodology
On the basis of constructivism and previous work by Chris Ogden (2010), the study
utilizes a research tool this researcher calls the “Norms Analysis Timeline,” or NAT. The
purpose of the tool is to plainly present to the reader a breakdown of international relations
norms for a particular case study country and policy area overtime. The timeline begins with the
events of 26/11/2008 in Mumbai, India and shifts in Pakistan policy occurring in the national
government. The next section is the shift in Indian policy towards Pakistan with the inauguration
of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014.
The presented NAT consists of four norm shift descriptors: before 26/11, after 26/11,
before Modi, and after Modi. Policy used in analysis does not exceed three years from the event
in question, with exception to the Modi government still in power, giving each analysis a sixyear span of 2006-2011 and 2012-Present. The NAT in this study is visualized by a table, with
the top boxes reading, “Major National Event,” “Norms Dictionary,” “Psychological
Perception,” and “Diplomatic Actions.” Observance of legislative and diplomatic endeavors of
the Government of India will serve as data in creating the NAT. Said information comes from
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India Code and the Ministry of External Affairs chronicling the actions and reactions over the
period in question. Two main areas of archival retrieval will take place in the
Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements and the Press Releases subsections of the Ministry’s Media
Center. The author expects to find significant reasoning in the NAT for insight into the question
of conflict perpetuation.
Subject of Analysis
I. Mumbai Attacks 26/11/2008
The landscape changed drastically in 2008. Over the span of four days, ten individuals
from the Kashmir-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, roughly translated to Army of the Pure, carried out
twelve strategic shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai, resulting in 166 casualties. The
attack, called “26/11” today, hit the hearts of Indians with the same heartbreak and deep
resentment that 9/11 created for American citizens. India finally realized that the true threat came
from non-state actors and shifted focus towards anti-separatist and terrorist organizations over
strategic relations with Pakistan, the country known to harbor such organizations to the dismay
of their Southeastern neighbor.
II. BJP of India
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stands as the ideological brother of the RSS. Their
origin was a breakoff from the Janata Party where members wished to hold dual membership
with the RSS. After party denial of dual membership, defectors created the BJP in 1980. They
hold Hindu nationalism dear to their political positions, and focus mainly on domestic issues in
their legislation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the current head of government, is a prominent
BJP/RSS dual member with no shame in considering himself an advocate for Hindutva.
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Historical Norms of Indian International Relations
Since partition of India and Pakistan, the countries clashed for Kashmir until today.
United Nations administered ceasefires for two interstate wars, in 1949 and 1965, but constant
conflict over disputed territory like former East Pakistan, current Bangladesh, and the Kashmir
Valley made peace in the region a pipedream. Within the Indian government, norms began to
surface on how to properly engage with Pakistan legislatively, diplomatically, and strategically.
The Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, engaged in legislation on Pakistan with the notion
of irredentism towards Kashmir, crafting policy initiatives revolving around defense over
diplomacy. Conflicts in 1999 and 2001 presented India with a new problem, non-state actors
within Pakistan conspiring against India. This notion delegitimized the Pakistani government for
Indian policymakers, but left the subcontinent eager to reach ceasefires and anti-terrorism
measures.
Leading up to the attack in 2008, several ministries of both countries engaged in various
talks on cooperation in diverse areas such as counterterrorism, repatriation of prisoners, and
nuclear confidence-building measures. These talks were mainly described by the Ministry of
External Affairs Joint Statements as “cordial” and “constructive.” The only bilateral meeting
with a divergent setting description was a 2007 meeting of the Home/Interior Ministers on
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, with “frank” and “candid” (MEA, 2007). The outlier bears no
significance at the time of the statement’s release, but would set a precedent after the events of
2008.
Norm Shift after 26/11
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India and Pakistan worked together from 2008 to 2010 on a dual investigation into the
26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks implemented by Lashkar-e-Taiba, with India trusting their
neighbor to carry out a thorough dismantling of terror outfits. However, India put out a statement
before the second anniversary condemning the Islamic Republic in a statement. “Lack of tangible
progress in delivering on this vital commitment is increasingly being viewed in the Indian public
opinion as dilatory and lacking in seriousness.”2 The Indian government shares only one bilateral
meeting in the period following 26/11 to March of 2011, a joint statement of the Prime Ministers
of India and Pakistan. The two leaders reassure with condemnations of terrorism in all forms
while also agreeing to enhanced information sharing. Besides this statement, no ministerial-level
talks between the countries were reported for two and a half years.
Bilateral relations on the cabinet-level restarted in March, 2011 with Home/Interior
secretary talks regarding ongoing investigations and prisoner repatriation. The gap in formal
relations between the two countries is most likely due to in-group favoritism, given the 26/11
bombing in 2008 alongside other acts of terrorism in that period. The Government of India
realized their constituents were uneasy with Pakistan’s housing of various terrorist cells and
perceived inability to try and sentence those accused of the Mumbai attacks in a timely manner.
As of January 2019, the 26/11 Trial in Pakistan remains active, with no clear end in sight
(Ahmad and Laskar, 2019). Although bilateral relations kick-started again in 2011, the lack of
Indian dialogue and perceived resentment sets a strong precedent for the nationalist party to
govern upon just three years later.
Norm Shift in Modi Era

2

Collected from the Ministry of External Affairs repository, November 2010.
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The victory of the Bharitya Janata Party in the general elections granted them an absolute
majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament. Narendra Modi, former Chief Minister
of Gujarat, became the new Prime Minister of India. During his term, local elections were in
favor of the BJP who now hold 15 of possible 29 Chief Minister positions across India, giving
Modi a 53% majority of state government legitimacy for his national vision.
The early days of BJP India saw Modi’s motivation to combat terrorism alongside his
South Asian partner in the President of Pakistan. Events in 2016 involving thwarted terrorists
and a successful killing of eight Indian security personnel in Uri led the Modi government to
greenlight a surgical strike on Pakistan in late September. Television coverage of the use of force
became Nationalistic, allowing Hindu citizens to feel superior to their Pakistani counterparts
(Pandit and Chattopadhyay, 2018). The retaliation of Pakistan was a series of ceasefire violations
through 2017 numbering in the hundreds. India in this period rescinded their desire for noninterference with this strike, leaving peace talks as an impossibility in the near future.
The most significant shift in Indian relations with Pakistan was the new use of diplomatic
demarches toward Pakistan. Demarches are official diplomatic cables sent to another country to
formally protest a decision or action taken by that state. The Ministry of External Affairs prior to
26/11 and Modi rarely implemented this tactic, only sending a demarche to the Netherlands
following the detention of 12 Indian nationals in 20063. Since Modi took office, Pakistan
received seven demarches between 2016 and 2019, making the BJP’s protest of current efforts of
Pakistani officials very clear. Modi’s focus on domestic legislation and diplomatic protest of his
neighbor nation define a shift in Indian foreign policy.

3

Collected from the Ministry of External Affairs repository, August, 2006.
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Constructing Kashmir Policy
Recent history of Indian relations with Pakistan provide information capable of
encapsulating the country’s direction in conflict perpetuation. The Ministry of External Affairs
maintains diplomatic relations with Pakistan throughout the early part of the 21st century,
reiterating seemingly several times of Pakistan’s commitments in 2004 to fight terrorism
targeting India with little response from the state. Several actions from non-state actors in the
period complicated India’s relations with Pakistan, delegitimizing the latter’s ability to uphold
security commitments, forcing India to change course with legislation and diplomatic efforts in
the Modi era. The full analysis in the visualization of a NAT lies below.
Norms Analysis Timeline – Pakistan Policy of India4
Major National
Event
26/11 – Before
2006-2008
26/11 – After
2009-2011
PM Modi – Before
2012-2014

Norms Dictionary
- Striving for Mutual
Respect, Peaceful
Coexistence, and NonInterference
- Striving for Mutual
Respect, Peaceful
Coexistence, and NonInterference
- Striving for Peaceful
Coexistence and
Non-Interference

Psychological
Perception
Regional allies in
the fight against
terrorism, part of
the same group.
In-Group
Favoritism based
on lack of bilateral
dialogue in this
period.
Restarting of
official relations,
but resentful of no
counterterror
results.

PM Modi – After
2014-Present

4

Diplomatic Actions
Bilateral Meetings:32
Demarches:1
Bilateral Meetings:12
Demarches:0

Bilateral Meetings:11
Demarches:0
Bilateral Meetings:2

- Striving for Peaceful
Coexistence?

Resentment and In
Group Favoritism.

Demarches:7

Model Created based on analyzed information collected from Indian Ministry of External Affairs and India Code
websites.
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Discussion
The table above reveals much about norm shifts in Indian policy towards Pakistan from
2006 to 2019. The second column, titled Norms Dictionary, breaks down the presence of the
three core norms set out by Prime Ministers of both nations, “Mutual Respect,” “Peaceful
Coexistence,” and “Non Interference.” Over time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs database
presents minimal dedication on India’s part in keeping with these norms. The term “Striving”
accentuates the tense historical relations and inability to facilitate said norms for long periods of
time. The removal of “Mutual Respect” derives from Pakistan’s delayed proceedings in regards
to 26/11 attackers, and India’s view of judicial superiority in counterterrorism. The absence of
“Non-Interference” in the Modi era comes through the use of retaliatory surgical strikes against
Pakistani targets after bombings in Jammu and Kashmir. Lastly, “Peaceful Coexistence”
precedes a question mark because of the uncertainty in the short term. The third column attempts
to clarify the psychological shifts of the Indian government with regards to Pakistan. “In Group
Favoritism” is found years after 26/11 and within the Modi Era due to building resentment of
Pakistan’s lack of action in counterterrorism.
The most significant column is titled “Diplomatic Actions,” or quantifiable government
action in relation to another nation state. The first period, 2006 to 2008, saw a status quo of
relations with frequent bilateral meetings and one demarche protest for an unrelated issue. Over
the next two periods, 2009 to 2014, India significantly decreased their bilateral meetings with
Pakistan, halting cabinet-level talks for a year-and-a-half period between 2008 and 2010. The
Modi era was most telling, seeing a drop to two meetings for the entire Prime Ministerial term,
replacing them with an unprecedented seven demarche cables over five years. Utilizing the
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Norms Analysis Timeline, it is clear that major shifts have taken place through sociopolitical and
ideological means.
Building on prior work in constructivism from the Indian perspective, the research
suggests a new theoretical addition to common international relations literature: psychological
aspects in national decision-making. The supplementation of interdisciplinary concepts like
psychology allows for a fresh perspective. Much like decision-making in individuals, nationstates provide a framework into their actions with the categorization tools of the alternative
social science. Combining international relations norms with group-related theories in
psychology gives researchers a broad range of qualitative avenues to pursue.
In terms of Kashmir, the Indian government is no closer to coming to conclusions with
Pakistan as a result of the norm shift. Typically, a change in office, with Imran Khan leading
Pakistan after 2018 and elections running in India in mid-2019, allows for the two countries to
start diplomatic relations fresh, but recent shifts call for more tension (Krepon, 2018). Both
nations find themselves under exceptionally-patriotic regimes, India being nationalist and
Pakistan populist. The end of the Kashmir struggle extends beyond the horizon once again, but
new decision-makers in government may garner better results down the line.
Limitations
The following limitations apply to this study. First, the specificity of the paper relating to
the relationship between India and Pakistan does not allow for direct generalization to other
conflicting nations outside of South Asia. However, the model of analysis is open to alternative
country case studies using foreign relations of a particular country. Second, the interdisciplinary
theorization, international relations and psychology, opens the paper to increased generalities of
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the two disciplines. The purpose of the combination is to show aspects of Constructivism in
international relations that include psychological underpinnings not found in most literature
representing the theory. Lastly, the research and analysis is presented from the United States
higher educational system, presenting areas of bias not found in literature coming directly from
the Republic of India. To combat this bias, much of the analysis attempts to pull from in-country
experience and nuance gained from the researcher in previous endeavors.
Conclusion
India and Pakistan seem to exist in a paradigm of cyclical conflict and attempted peace
dialogue. The research suggests a shift in Indian foreign policy norms with two catalysts being
the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks and the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the BJP.
India attempts to maintain three foundations in their foreign policy: mutual respect, peaceful
coexistence and non-interference. Following the 26/11 bombings and subsequent trails in
Pakistan, India lost its sense of respect for the validity of the Pakistani judicial system and their
diligence in counterterrorism efforts. During the Modi administration, surgical strikes and
diplomatic protests in the form of demarches rescinded India’s desire for non-interference. The
final pillar, peaceful coexistence, remains in place as a goal rather than a reality. Psychologically,
India presents In-Group Favoritism in their foreign policy with Pakistan, sensing a danger from
Pakistani nationals after 26/11 and the acceptance of BJP nationalist ideology for national
governance. Conflicting relations between the South Asian nations reflects the new norm for the
Indian Republic, with future possibilities of peace out of reach.
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